Cutting to the Chase: Corporate Liability for the Environmental Harm Under the Alien Tort Statute, Kiobel, and Congress by Kupersmith, Tony
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 37 | Issue 3 Article 9
Cutting to the Chase: Corporate Liability for the
Environmental Harm Under the Alien Tort Statute,
Kiobel, and Congress
Tony Kupersmith
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Tony Kupersmith, Cutting to the Chase: Corporate Liability for the Environmental Harm Under the
Alien Tort Statute, Kiobel, and Congress, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 885 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol37/iss3/9
CUTTING TO THE CHASE: CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE, KIOBEL, AND CONGRESS
TONY KUPERSMITH*
Prospectors first discovered commercial quantities of oil in Nigeria
over fifty years ago.1 Today, the country’s oil industry “accounts for over 95
percent of export earnings and about 40 percent of government revenues,”2
but the environmental costs have been nearly as staggering as the financial
benefits. For instance, a recent study by the United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”) found that Shell and other oil firms contaminated
nearly 400 square miles in the Niger Delta that will cost one billion dollars
to clean up over the next thirty years.3 As a consequence, numerous law-
suits have been filed against Shell for negligently cleaning up the spills
and other environmental damage.4
Nigeria is not alone when it comes to multinational corporations
causing environmental disasters. Other incidents include Union Carbide’s
1984 toxic gas release in Bhopal, India; Texaco’s 18 billion gallons of toxic
* B.A. The College of William & Mary, 2005. J.D. William & Mary Law School, 2012. The
author would like to thank Professor Alemante Selassie for piquing my interest in the
Alien Tort Statute; the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review board
and staff members for their hard work in producing this Note; and finally, my family and
friends for their support throughout law school.
1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HRW INDEX NO. 1-56432-225-4, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES
25 (Jan. 1999).
2 UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: NIGERIA (2011),
available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf.
3 John Vidal, Niger Delta Oil Spills Clean-up Will Take 30 Years, Says UN, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.theguardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/04/niger-delta-oil-spill
-clean-up-un.
4 See, e.g., Case Profile: Shell Lawsuit (Re Nigeria), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE
CENTRE, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatory
action/LawsuitsSelectedcases/ShelllawsuitreNigeria. “In May 2008, four Nigerian fisherman
and farmers from the villages of Goi, Ikot Ada Udo and Oruma [in the Niger Delta region],
in conjunction with Friends of the Earth Netherlands/Milieundefersie and supported by
Friends of the Earth Nigeria/ERA, started a legal case against Shell Nigeria and its parent
company in the Netherlands.” Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, Pollution: Dutch Court to Hear
Nigerians Suit Against Shell, THIS DAY LIVE (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.thisdaylive.com
/articles/Pollution-dutch-court-to-hear-nigerians-suit-against-Shell/126561.
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runoff into Ecuador’s Lago Agrio which began in 1964 and continues to
cause high levels of cancer; and Trafigura Corporation’s 2006 dumping
of hydrogen sulfide “slops” into the waters of Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast.5
These cases underscore the tension between business and global trade on
the one hand, and the need to preserve the environment and protect host
communities on the other. Unfortunately, citizens of certain foreign coun-
tries cannot always rely on their own domestic court systems as a forum
to enforce corporate social responsibility.6 However, such a forum exists in
the United States in the form of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), also known
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), which gives U.S. district courts
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”7
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. recently cast doubt on whether the ATS can function as a
viable enforcement mechanism against environmentally negligent corpo-
rations.8 However, the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co.9 and the D.C. Circuit in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.10 reached
the opposite conclusion in two recent opinions, confirming a split among
the circuits. In response, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Kiobel case, and, after twice hearing oral arguments,11
is expected to render a final decision in June 2013.12
5 See, e.g., The World’s Worst Environmental Disasters Caused by Companies, BUSINESS
PUNDIT (June 21, 2010, 12:29 PM) http://www.businesspundit.com/the-worlds-worst
-environmental-disasters-caused-by-companies/.
6 See, e.g., MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX
2012–2013 49, available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index
_Report_2012.pdf. “Despite ongoing reforms, many countries [in Sub-Saharan Africa] lack
adequate checks on executive authority, and government accountability is also weak.
Many public institutions and courts throughout the region are inefficient and vulnerable
to undue influence.” Id.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
8 See 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010).
9 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
10 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
11 See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller, A Surprise Twist: U.S. Supreme Court Will Rehear Kiobel,
CORPORATE SOC. RESPONSIBILITY & THE LAW (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.csrandthelaw.com
/2012/03/a-surprise-twist-u-s-supreme-court-will-rehear-kiobel/. The first hearing focused
on the issue of corporate liability, but several Justices broached the subject of extra-
territorial application of the ATS during questioning. Id. The second hearing focused
exclusively on extraterritoriality, i.e., the extent to which the ATS applies when the tort
occurs overseas. Id.
12 E.g., Pieter Bekker & Brittany Prelogar, Dutch Court Orders Shell Nigeria to Compensate
Nigerians for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Third-Party Sabotage in Nigeria, STEPTOE
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This Note will argue that corporate social responsibility, particu-
larly in the environmental context, should be a priority under the ATS.
Corporate liability, as envisioned in Flomo and Doe, is essential for strik-
ing an appropriate balance between global trade, environmental protec-
tion, and the welfare of local communities. However, even with corporate
liability intact, the ATS remains an imperfect mechanism for ensuring
responsible environmental practices.
More can and should be done by the United States to help the ATS
achieve greater relevance in this increasingly important field. The most
direct options include amending the ATS to specifically permit environ-
mental tort cases or the United States becoming a signatory to more strin-
gent international environmental treaties. The trajectory of customary
international law is such that environmental torts will likely be recog-
nized sooner rather than later under the “law of nations,” but this fact
should not prevent the United States from taking a more proactive role.
After all, Congress has passed bills that explicitly target corporate respon-
sibility, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which the government
uses to hold companies liable for bribery abroad.13 Is paying officials under
the table for special treatment really that much more egregious than caus-
ing billions upon billions of dollars worth of environmental damage in
foreign countries? The answer, of course, is no.
In addressing these issues, Part I of this Note provides an overview
of the ATS, including the statute’s history and development to the present
day. Part II examines the current circuit split over whether corporations
should be held liable under the ATS and advocates that the majority posi-
tion, which endorses corporate liability, is the correct one. Part III discusses
the application of the ATS to environmental disasters and the extent to
which international law recognizes environmental torts. Finally, Part IV
analyzes congressional attempts to regulate corporate behavior in foreign
countries and urges the adoption of an amendment codifying corporate
liability under the ATS.
& JOHNSON, LLP (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-714
.html (“[Kiobel] is currently under review by the US Supreme Court, which is considering
both the availability of corporate liability under the ATS and the statute’s extraterritorial
reach. A decision is expected by June 2013.”) (citations omitted).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (2006); see also An Overview, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to pre-
vent certain persons from making illegal payments to foreign government officials).
888 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:885
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ATS
This section surveys the history of the ATS and provides an over-
view of how plaintiffs bring suit under the statute.
A. History
The ATS originated with the Judiciary Act of 1789.14 Though no
legislative history exists, the United States Supreme Court explained in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that Congress intended the statute to address a
“narrow set of violations of the law of nations,” which threatened “serious
consequences in international affairs.”15 Among these were violations of
safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy, ac-
cording to Blackstone’s Commentaries.16 Granting jurisdiction over such
delicate matters to federal courts was part of a general scheme under the
Judiciary Act to keep questions of international law away from the states.17
In practice, the ATS got off to a slow start: “during the nearly two
centuries after the statute’s promulgation, jurisdiction was maintained
under the ATS in only two cases.”18 The first case, Bolchos v. Darrel,
arose in 1795 in a South Carolina district court and involved the seizure
of a vessel carrying slaves.19 Bolchos alleged that Darrel wrongfully took
possession of the slaves and brought suit to recover the profits from their
sale.20 The district court found that jurisdiction existed based in part on
the ATS as a violation of a United States treaty with France.21 The sec-
ond case,22 Adra v. Clift, involved a custody battle between the Lebanese
Ambassador to Iran and his ex-wife, an Iraqi citizen then residing in
14 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 14A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3661.1 (3d ed.)
(2012).
15 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
16 Id.
17 Helen Lucas, The Adjudication of Violations of International Law Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: Allowing Alien Plaintiffs Their Day in Federal Court, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 231,
237 (1987).
18 Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007).
19 3 F.Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (identifying Bolchos v.
Darrel and Adra v. Clift as the only two district court cases involving the ATS between its
enactment in 1789 and the modern era of ATS litigation marked by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala).
2013] CUTTING TO THE CHASE 889
Baltimore, Maryland.23 The ambassador claimed that his ex-wife had
violated the law of nations by failing to deliver custody of their daughter
as required by Islamic and Lebanese law.24 The district court found that
the defendant had committed such a violation by wrongfully withholding
the child and breaching Lebanese passport control laws in her efforts to
bring the child to the United States.25
Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, however, plaintiffs have in-
voked the ATS with increasing frequency, relying on a range of “law of
nations” claims that go far beyond the original violations identified in
Sosa.26 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit held that “deliberate torture per-
petrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights.”27 The plaintiff sued a
Paraguayan government official under the ATS for torturing and killing
the plaintiff’s son as retribution for his longstanding opposition to the
Paraguayan government.28 In granting jurisdiction under the ATS, the
court found that state-sanctioned torture had been universally condemned
in “numerous international agreements” and renounced by “virtually all
of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice).”29
In addition to torture, courts have granted ATS jurisdiction for
claims of forced labor,30 genocide,31 involuntary medical experimentation,32
systematic denial of political and free speech rights,33 and harmful effects
23 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D.Md. 1961).
24 Id. at 863.
25 Id. at 863–65.
26 See, e.g., Taveras, 477 F.3d at 771 (citing ATS cases involving torture, genocide, summary
executions, and other human rights abuses).
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 880.
30 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part by 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting ATS jurisdiction over plaintiff Burmese
villagers’ claim of forced labor against defendant oil company).
31 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting ATS juris-
diction over plaintiff Croat and Muslim citizens’ genocide claims against defendant leader
of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces).
32 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2009) (granting ATS
jurisdiction over plaintiff Nigerian children’s claim that defendant pharmaceutical com-
pany engaged in involuntary medical experimentation).
33 See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing
a cause of action against the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front for denial
of those rights, but dismissing those claims as against President Robert Mugabe and other
government officials due to sovereign immunity).
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of aerial pesticide fumigation.34 By contrast, courts have denied jurisdiction
for fraud,35 libel,36 maritime actions,37 and certain environmental pollution
claims,38 among others.
B. Bringing Suit Under the Two Prongs of the ATS
The ATS offers plaintiffs the choice between bringing suit for a
“violation of the ‘law of nations’ or a ‘treaty of the United States.’ ”39
1. The First Prong of the ATS: “Law of Nations”
Under the first prong of the ATS, plaintiffs can bring suit for torts
that violate the “law of nations,” which is more commonly referred to as
“customary international law.”40 Sources of customary international law
include “the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law . . . or by the
general usage and practice of nations . . . or by judicial decisions.”41
Generally, this prong of the ATS is triggered when “there has been
a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules, or cus-
toms that govern the relationships between states or between individuals
and foreign states.”42 The test used to determine whether emerging cus-
toms constitute the “law of nations” involves analyzing their 18th century
counterparts: “courts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms [that the Supreme Court has] recognized.”43
34 See, e.g., Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221, 221 (D.D.C. 2007).
35 See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying ATS jurisdiction
for Luxembourg investment trust’s claims for fraud against Bahamian corporation).
36 See, e.g., Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980) (denying ju-
risdiction under ATS for lack of consistent international norms or treaties involving libel).
37 See, e.g., Dmaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., 255 F. Supp. 919, 923
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (denying jurisdiction under ATS for alleged violation of the Jones Act).
38 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 266 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying ATS
jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ right to life and health claims stemming from environmental
damage).
39 See, e.g., Kathleen Jaeger, Environmental Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 519, 519 (2010).
40 Jurisdiction Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 18B FED. PROC., L. Ed. § 45:2440 (2012).
41 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
42 See Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
43 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (emphasis added).
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Put another way, courts address two issues when analyzing emerg-
ing norms of customary international law: (1) whether the norm has been
universally accepted; and (2) whether it has been sufficiently defined.44
Finally, courts must consider the “practical consequences” of making a
cause of action available to litigants in federal court.45
2. The Second Prong of the ATS: “Treaty of the United States”
Under the second prong of the ATS, plaintiffs can sue for torts
violating “a treaty of the United States.”46 Such treaties are “formal agree-
ment[s] between the United States and one or more other sovereigns, en-
tered into by the President and approved by two-thirds of the Senate.”47
Accordingly, “a treaty not ratified by the United States at the time of the
alleged events cannot form a basis for an ATS claim.”48 Ratification is
distinguished from signing as follows: “a State’s signing of a treaty serves
only to authenticate its text; it does not establish the signatory’s consent
to be bound. . . . A State only becomes bound by—that is, becomes a party
to—a treaty when it ratifies the treaty.”49 Furthermore, ratified treaties
must be either self-executing or implemented through an act of Congress
for plaintiffs to rely on them under this prong of the ATS.50 Finally, if the
treaty provides a specific remedy for violations, then plaintiffs cannot
rely on it to establish jurisdiction under the ATS.51
44 For example, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, “the Court accepted that [while] a rule against
arbitrary detention in some forms might command universal agreement, there was insuf-
ficient agreement that the specific conduct in Sosa, a detention for only one day, violated
that rule.” Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 362 (2011).
45 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
47 Abagninin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S.
Const. Art. II, §2, cl. 2, which outlines the requirements for ratifying a treaty).
48 Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
49 See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotations omitted).
50 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 735 (finding the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights to be insufficient under the second prong of the ATS despite having
been ratified by the United States because it was not self-executing and had not been exe-
cuted by separate legislation in the United States); Flores, 414 F.3d at 257 n.34 (comparing
self-executing treaties, which immediately create enforceable rights and duties of individuals,
with non-self-executing treaties, which require implementation by the government).
51 E.g., Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 33 F.R.D. 348, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (denying jurisdiction under the ATS for alleged violations of a treaty
between the United States and Canada concerning boundary waters that required contes-
tants to submit to an international joint commission for adjudication).
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II. CORPORATE LIABILITY
This section describes the corporate liability debate generally and
then discusses the key cases—Kiobel, Flomo, and Doe—in detail, ulti-
mately concluding that corporations should not be immune from suit
under the ATS.
A. The Corporate Liability Debate
The corporate liability debate stems from a footnote penned by
Justice Souter in the Sosa case.52 In Sosa, the Supreme Court refused
to recognize the plaintiff’s abduction claim as a violation of the “law of
nations” for the purposes of ATS jurisdiction.53 In 1985, a Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (“DEA”) agent was abducted, tortured, and murdered while
working in Mexico.54 During the course of its investigation, DEA concluded
that plaintiff Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican doctor, had played a role in inter-
rogating the deceased agent, so the DEA concocted a plan to seize Alvarez-
Machain and bring him to the United States.55 After being extradited,
Alvarez-Machain faced trial in federal court for the agent’s murder but
was ultimately acquitted.56 Alvarez-Machain then sued those responsible
for his extradition, claiming that Sosa violated the “law of nations” by
abducting him.57
Addressing the ATS for the first time, the Supreme Court surveyed
the statute’s history and underpinnings to determine: (1) whether it could
recognize emerging norms of international law as “law of nations” under
the ATS without congressional action, and (2) if so, which norms should
be recognized.58 From this exercise the Court concluded that it could recog-
nize emerging norms but only those “accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms” identified by Blackstone, such as infringement of the rights
of ambassadors and piracy.59 Justice Souter then sought to elaborate on
the “defined with specificity” element, noting: “the determination whether
a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and,
52 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
53 Id. at 739.
54 Id. at 697.
55 Id. at 697–98.
56 Id. at 698.
57 Id.
58 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–25.
59 Id. at 715, 724–25 (emphasis added).
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indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practi-
cal consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal
courts.”60 Continuing in the same vein, Justice Souter made a brief but
noteworthy foray into the issue of corporate liability, thereby giving rise
to the current debate:
A related consideration is whether international law ex-
tends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm
to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual. Compare Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic (insufficient consensus in 1984 that
torture by private actors violates international law), with
Kadic v. Kardzíc (sufficient consensus in 1995 that geno-
cide by private actors violates international law).61
Though Sosa did not involve corporate liability, Justice Souter may have
been responding to the fact that early ATS cases focused on state actors
while the “second wave” targeted U.S. and foreign corporations.62 Applying
the specificity and acceptance test to Alvarez’s claim, the Court ultimately
concluded that “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, vio-
lates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support
the creation of a federal remedy.”63
Prior to Sosa, most courts assumed that corporations could be liable
under the ATS and refrained from addressing the question directly.64 But,
the Second Circuit challenged this longstanding consensus in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum.65
B. Kiobel: Customary International Law Does Not Support
Corporate Liability
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit denied ATS jurisdiction over plaintiff
Nigerian villagers’ human rights violation claims based on corporate lia-
bility concerns: “insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS against
60 Id. at 732–33.
61 Id. at 732 n.20 (citations omitted).
62 Ku, supra note 44, at 360.
63 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
64 See Ku, supra note 44, at 366–67.
65 Id. at 372.
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corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations, and
plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by the ATS.”66
Since 1958, defendant Royal Dutch Shell and its successor entities have
exploited oil resources in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.67 Responding to the
environmental impact of Shell’s operation, local residents formed a pro-
test movement, which the Nigerian government attempted to suppress in
1993.68 The plaintiffs ultimately sued Shell “under the ATS for aiding
and abetting the Nigerian government in alleged violations of the law of
nations,” including extrajudicial killing; crimes against humanity; torture;
inhuman and degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; viola-
tion of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; forced exile; and,
property destruction.69 The district court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for property destruction, forced exile,
extrajudicial killing, and rights to life, liberty, security, and association on
the grounds that they failed Sosa’s “defined with specificity” requirement.70
However, the court granted jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for detention,
crimes against humanity, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment.71
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in reaching its conclusion that
no corporate liability exists for human rights violations, first determined
that customary international law governs the “scope of liability” (as de-
scribed by the Supreme Court in footnote twenty of the Sosa opinion)—i.e.,
the identity of proper defendants—and then considered various sources of
international law dealing with corporate liability in the human rights
context.72 Critical to the majority’s determination that international law,
as opposed to domestic law, governs the “scope of liability” was the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg’s (“Nuremberg Tribunal”)
finding that individuals could be held liable for human rights violations
under international law.73 The majority also described the “fundamental
point” of Sosa’s footnote twenty as requiring courts to “look to customary
international law to determine the scope of liability” and noted that this
is true “not only when a court is questioning whether the scope of liabil-
ity . . . includes private actors (as opposed to state actors), but also when
66 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
67 Id. at 123.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 124.
71 Id.
72 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125.
73 Id. at 126–27.
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a court is questioning whether the scope of liability . . . includes juridical
persons (as opposed to natural persons).”74 Finally, the court found its
conclusion about international law governing the “scope of liability” to be
consistent with Second Circuit precedent.75
The majority then turned to the sources of international law, be-
ginning with the Nuremberg Tribunal, which it characterized as “the single
most important source of modern customary international law concerning
liability for violations of fundamental human rights.”76 Corporate liability
was not recognized under international law at the time of the Nuremberg
trials, the court argued, because the Nuremberg Tribunal “declined” to
hold I.G. Farben, the “most nefarious corporate enterprise known to the
civilized world,” accountable for supplying the Nazi regime with Zyklon B
and other chemical agents used in gas chambers of Auschwitz.77 Instead,
the Nuremberg Tribunal concerned itself exclusively with the prosecution
of individuals, including twenty-four Farben company executives, which
demonstrated that “liability under the law of nations . . . could not be
divorced from individual moral responsibility,” according to the court.78
The majority then surveyed international war crimes tribunals
since the Nuremberg Tribunal, concluding that these too had “declined
to hold corporations liable for violations of customary international law.”79
For instance, the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court considered but rejected France’s proposal to extend criminal lia-
bility to corporations because “many national legal orders” still rejected
such liability.80
Likewise, with respect to international treaties, the majority found
that “the relatively few international treaties that impose particular ob-
ligations on corporations do not establish corporate liability as a ‘specific,
universal, and obligatory’ norm of customary international law” as required
by Sosa.81 These included the Convention Concerning the Application
of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively;
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy;
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage;
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; Convention
74 Id. at 129 n.31.
75 Id. at 128–30.
76 Id. at 132–33.
77 Id. at 135–36.
78 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135 (emphasis in original).
79 Id. at 136.
80 Id. at 136–37.
81 Id. at 141.
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Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material; and Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources.82 Characterizing these treaties as dealing with “specialized
questions,” the majority found that they not only failed to “codify an
existing, general rule of customary international law,” but also could not
“be viewed as crystallizing an emerging norm of customary international
law.”83 Instead, the court reasoned that the treaties “suggest a trend to-
wards imposing corporate liability in some special contexts.”84
Next, the majority reviewed the “works of publicists,” concluding
that these “authorities demonstrate that imposing liability on corpora-
tions for violations of customary international law has not attained a dis-
cernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in
their relations inter se.”85 Central to this finding were affidavits filed in
a separate case by two British professors, who “forcefully declared . . . that
customary international law does not recognize liability for corporations
that violate its norms.”86
Finally, the majority responded to Judge Leval’s concurring opinion,
noting that Judge Leval conceded that “international law, of its own force,
imposes no liabilities on corporations,” but disagreed with the court’s con-
clusion that “customary international law supplies the rule of decision.”87
The majority also sought to discredit two key opinions relied upon by
Judge Leval in his concurrence: Attorney General William Bradford’s
1795 opinion88 that “a corporation can sue under the ATS,” and Attorney
General Charles L. Bonaparte’s 1907 opinion that “a corporation can be
sued under the ATS.”89
Kiobel represents an unexpected and decisive departure from the
status quo of assuming that corporations may be held liable under the
ATS. This is so whether one reads Kiobel as barring corporate liability in
all ATS cases or just those involving human rights violations.90 Because
82 Id. at 138 n.40.
83 Id. at 139.
84 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 (emphasis in original).
85 Id. at 142, 145.
86 Id. at 143.
87 Id. at 145.
88 Id. at 142 n.44 (citing 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795)).
89 Id. (citing 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250, 253 (1907)).
90 Based on the facts, Kiobel’s holding appears limited to corporate liability in the human
rights context; however, the majority’s opinion frequently speaks of corporate liability in
more general terms, including in the final holding: “[t]o summarize, we hold as follows . . . .
[t]he concept of corporate liability for violations of customary international law has not
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legal entities, such as corporations, tend to be responsible for the most
significant instances of environmental degradation, Kiobel essentially
nullifies the “law of nations” prong of the ATS as an avenue for corporate
social responsibility in the environmental context.91
C. Flomo and Doe: Rationalizing Corporate Liability
Under the ATS
Two courts—the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit—recently responded to Kiobel, establishing a clear split among
the circuits.
1. Flomo
In Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., the Seventh Circuit held
in an opinion written by Judge Posner that corporations could be liable
under the ATS.92 Firestone Natural Rubber Company (“Firestone”) oper-
ated a 118,000-acre rubber plantation in Liberia, which employed twenty-
three Liberian children who ultimately became the plaintiffs in this case.93
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Firestone “utiliz[ed] hazardous child
labor . . . in violation of customary international law.”94
Judge Posner summarized Firestone’s argument as thus: “because
corporations, unlike individuals, have never been prosecuted for criminal
violations of customary international law, there cannot be a norm, let alone
a ‘universal’ one, forbidding them to commit crimes against humanity and
other acts that the civilized world abhors.”95 Judge Posner then identified
the circuit split, noting that “[a]ll but one of the cases at our level hold or
assume (mainly the latter) that corporations can be liable,”96 and seized
on Kiobel as the “outlier” case.97
achieved universal recognition or acceptance as a norm in the relations of States with each
other.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
91 It is unclear whether Kiobel, if affirmed by the Supreme Court, would also extinguish
the “treaty” prong of the ATS because the plaintiffs in that case proceeded under the “law
of nations” prong and the majority focused its analysis on the same. See infra Part II.D
(speculating on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming ruling).
92 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).
93 Id. at 1015.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1017.
96 Id. (citations omitted).
97 Id.
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Judge Posner then assembled the majority’s arguments for cor-
porate liability, beginning with an assault on Kiobel ’s faulty “factual
premise.”98 Judge Posner found that, contrary to the Kiobel majority’s
view, the Nuremberg Tribunal under Control Council Law No. 9 deter-
mined that “I.G. Farben . . . had knowingly and prominently engaged in
building up and maintaining the German war potential” and “ordered the
seizure of all [Farben’s] assets and that some of them be made available
for reparations.”99 In addressing why corporations have rarely been pros-
ecuted criminally, Judge Posner reasoned that criminal liability “would
move quickly from periphery to center if corporate civil liability were un-
available.”100 Unlike criminal liability, the court stressed, “civil and cor-
porate tort liability is common around the world.”101 From this the court
inferred that “[i]f a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be
punished criminally for violating customary international law . . . then . . .
if the board of directors of a corporation directs the corporations managers
to commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or use slave
labor, the corporation can be civilly liable.”102
In its next phase of argument, the court distinguished between a
norm of international law, which assigns rights and duties, and “the means
of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or remedy.”103 Describing the
importance of this distinction in the starkest terms, Judge Posner noted:
If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such viola-
tions was itself a norm of international law, no claims
under the Alien Tort Statute could ever be successful, even
claims against individuals; only the United States, as far
as we know, has a statute that provides a civil remedy for
violations of customary international law.104
Whether a corporation should be subject to tort liability, the court further
clarified, is a “remedial question” for the federal judiciary “to answer in
98 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
99 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Control Council Law No. 9, Providing for the
Seizure of Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof, Nov. 30, 1945,
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01LAW06.pdf.
100 Id. at 1019.
101 Id. (citing PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
46–50 (2010)).
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 Id.
104 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019 (emphasis added).
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light of its experience with particular remedies and its immersion in the
nation’s legal culture, rather than questions the answers to which could
be found in customary international law.”105 Simply put, “[i]nternational
law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide
how to enforce them.”106
To quiet any lingering concerns, the court pointed to in rem judg-
ments against pirate ships as evidence of liability for violations of custom-
ary international law against “an entity that does not breathe.”107
Finally, with respect to defining the scope of corporate liability, the
court accepted the plaintiff’s concession that “corporate liability . . . is
limited to cases in which the violations are directed, encouraged, or con-
doned at the corporate defendant’s decisionmaking [sic] level.”108
The court then proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the case, ulti-
mately concluding that plaintiffs failed to provide “an adequate basis for
inferring a violation of customary international law, bearing in mind the
Supreme Court’s insistence on caution in recognizing new norms of cus-
tomary international law in litigation under the Alien Tort Statute.”109
Flomo is a factually sound and well-reasoned response to Kiobel.
It also represents an important step towards ensuring that foreign vic-
tims of environmental torts will be able to rely on the ATS. By leaving the
remedy for international law violations to the federal judiciary, both the
plaintiff and defendant can be assured that a fair-minded and experienced
panel of judges will determine the scope of liability.
2. Doe
In Doe, the D.C. Circuit recognized corporate liability on the
grounds that “neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports
corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed
by its agents in violation of the law of nations.”110 Prior to the suit, defen-
dant Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) had been engaged in the extrac-
tion of natural gas in the Aceh province of Indonesia.111 Conflict between
105 Id. at 1020 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995)).
106 Id. (citing, inter alia, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1964)).
107 Id. at 1021 (citing The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233–34 (1844); The Marianna
Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40–41 (1825)).
108 Id. at 1020–21.
109 Id. at 1024.
110 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
111 Id.
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local villagers and Exxon ensued, resulting in a lawsuit against the cor-
poration for murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment under the ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”).112
With respect to corporate liability, the court, echoing Flomo,
began by emphasizing the important distinction between causes of action
and remedies:
It is clear from the fact that the law of nations, outside of
certain treaties . . . creates no civil remedies and no pri-
vate right of action that federal courts must determine the
nature of any remedy in lawsuits alleging violations of the
law of nations by reference to federal common law rather
than customary international law.113
The majority maintained that Sosa “instructs that the substantive con-
tent of the common law cause of action . . . in ATS cases must have its
source in customary international law,” but did not address the question
of “whether a corporation can be made to pay damages for the conduct of
its agents in violation of the law of nations.”114
The court then ascertained from historical sources that corporate
liability is consistent with the purpose of the ATS.115 Under the Articles
of Confederation, the court noted, the federal government was unable to
“remedy” violations of the law of nations.116 In response, the Continental
Congress adopted a resolution asking the States to provide “expeditious,
exemplary, and adequate punishments” for violations of safe conduct, the
immunities of ambassadors, and treaties, among others.117 This resolu-
tion is considered the “direct precursor” to the ATS.118 Concern over the
112 Id.
113 Id. at 41–42. To support its assertion that international law creates no civil remedies,
the court referenced, inter alia, the works of Professor Louis Henkin, “a leading authority
on international law,” who explains that “international law establishes rights, duties, and
remedies for states against states . . . [but] does not require any particular reaction to
violations of law.” Id. (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 245–46 (1996)).
114 Id. at 41.
115 Id. at 43.
116 Doe, 654 F.3d at 43.
117 Id. at 43–44 (citing 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789 1136–37
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)).
118 Id. at 44 (citing Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 477 (1989)).
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States’ ability to address violations of the law of nations, however, mani-
fested itself during the Constitutional Convention, causing Alexander
Hamilton to remark, “the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes [of action] in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”119
Consequently, passage of the ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789 filled the
“gap” in federal subject-matter jurisdiction involving violations of the law
of nations and treaties.120 Thus, in summarizing the origins and purposes
of the ATS, the court noted:
[P]rior to the Constitutional Convention, when the new
nation was at risk of losing respect abroad because it could
not respond to violations of the law of nations, the Founders
and the First Congress recognized that the inability to re-
spond to such violations could lead to the United States’ en-
tanglement in foreign conflicts when a single citizen abroad
offended a foreign power by violating the law of nations.121
Corporate liability would also be consistent with the ATS, the court
explained, because corporate liability “in tort” was a prominent tort law
concept by 1789.122 Citing Lord Mansfield and early state Supreme Court
cases, the court concluded that the notion of corporate liability “would
not have been surprising to the First Congress that enacted the ATS.”123
In its third phase of analysis, the court again approached Kiobel
head-on, asserting that the law of nations does not condone corporate
immunity for human rights violations.124 For support, the court pointed
to an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
holding, which defined crimes against humanity as requiring acts “insti-
gated” by “any organization or group,” as well as “numerous international
treaties that explicitly state that juridical entities should be liable for vio-
lations of the law of nations.”125
119 Doe, 654 F.3d at 45 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 494, 495 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)).
120 Id. at 45–46.
121 Id. at 46.
122 Doe, 654 F.3d at 47–48.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 48–49.
125 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment,
¶¶ 654–55 (May 7, 1997); Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees at 7–10, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642
F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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The court then charged defendant Exxon and the Kiobel majority
with “misread[ing]” footnote twenty in Sosa.126 Specifically, the court ex-
plained Justice Souter’s comparison in footnote twenty of Tel-Oren and
Kadic as confirming that, with respect to identifying proper defendants
under the ATS, international law should only be consulted to the extent
that it distinguishes between public and private actors.127 Both cases, ac-
cording to the court, “addressed whether certain forms of conduct were
violations of international law only when done by a state actor . . . and not
when done by a private actor.”128 However, the court noted that neither
Tel-Oren nor Kadic “considered a dichotomy between a natural and a
juridical person, even though Tel-Oren involved a juridical defendant, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.”129 Thus, the question addressed in
footnote twenty was not whether corporations could be liable under the
ATS, but rather whether “the violated norm is one that international law
applies only against States” or against both States and “private actors.”130
The key takeaway from footnote twenty, then, is that, contrary to the
Kiobel majority’s view, Sosa does not provide conclusive guidance on which
body of law courts must look to determine whether corporate liability
exists in a given situation.131
Answering the question left open by footnote twenty, the court
found that “technical accoutrements” to causes of action under ATS, such
as corporate liability and agency law, should come from federal common
law, not customary international law.132 Support for this conclusion, the
court found, derives from Sosa’s recognition that “the tort cause of action
under the ATS is derived from federal common law.”133
Even if international law did control the issue, the court continued,
support for corporate liability exists in this body of law.134 First, echoing
the majority in Flomo, the court found that the Allies embraced corporate
liability during the Nuremberg Tribunal proceedings with respect to I.G.
Farben, a German company that supported the Nazi regime.135 Like Judge
126 Id. at 50.
127 Id.
128 Doe, 654 F.3d at 50.
129 Id.




133 Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720–21 (2004)).
134 Doe, 654 F.3d at 51–52.
135 Id. at 52.
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Posner in Flomo, the court cited Council Control Law No. 9, which found
that I.G. Farben “knowingly and prominently” supported the German war
effort and resulted in the entity’s dissolution.136 Thus, according to the
court, I.G. Farben’s demise at the hands of the international community
affirmed the existence of corporate liability in international law to the
same extent that the Nuremberg trials established individual liability for
crimes against humanity.137 As the court put it:
[T]he corporate death penalty enforced against I.G. Farben
was as much an application of customary international law,
on which Control Council Law No. 9 was based, as the sen-
tences imposed by the tribunals themselves: the Allies de-
termined that I.G. Farben had committed violations of the
law of nations and therefore destroyed it.138
Second, the court found that Kiobel had overlooked “general prin-
ciples” of law, which support corporate liability, as a “proper source” of
customary international law in its analysis.139 General principles, the
court explained, “become international law by [their] widespread applica-
tion domestically by civilized nations.”140 Evidence of corporate liability
as a general principle of law arises from the fact that “no domestic juris-
diction exempts legal persons from liability,” according to an amicus brief
filed in the Kiobel litigation, and is confirmed by International Court of
Justice rulings.141
Like Flomo, the majority’s conclusion in Doe that corporations can
be held liable under the ATS represents an important step towards hold-
ing corporations accountable for environmental damage in foreign coun-
tries. Doe compliments Flomo in challenging Kiobel’s premise that the
Nuremberg proceedings were limited to individuals and expands the cor-
porate liability analysis by delving deeper into the ATS’s history and the
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-
Cross-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 11–12, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2010)).
139 Id. at 53.
140 Doe, 654 F.3d at 54 (citing BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (2006); H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33–35 (1927); F.A. Mann, Reflections
on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B.I.L. 20, 34–39 (1957)).
141 Id. at 53 (citing Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 38–39 (Feb. 20)).
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sosa. When adjudicating the corporate lia-
bility issue in Kiobel, the Supreme Court will be hard-pressed to ignore
Flomo and Doe’s comprehensive and persuasive analyses.
D. How Should the Supreme Court Rule?
The three cases discussed above—Kiobel, Flomo, and Doe—took
the following factors into consideration in analyzing corporate liability:
the plain language of the statute; the history and purpose of the ATS; the
Supreme Court’s approach in Sosa; and customary international law. While
the courts raised important arguments with respect to each factor, the most
important factor and the one that should be central to the Supreme Court’s
analysis in the forthcoming Kiobel opinion is the history and purpose of
the ATS—i.e., Congress’s intent in passing the statute.
This is so for several reasons. First, the plain language of the ATS
is vague, and the statute lacks a clear legislative history.142 Second, in Sosa
the Supreme Court focused extensively on history and purpose in conclud-
ing that the ATS gave federal courts jurisdiction over a limited set of claims
without the need for further congressional action and in fashioning a rule
for recognizing emerging norms of international law under the statute.
Third, the circuit courts’ inquiries into customary international law were
inconclusive, with each side providing valid evidence in favor of or against
corporate liability. Thus, focusing primarily on the history and purpose
of the ATS offers the best rubric for deciding whether and to what extent
corporations should be held liable under the statute.
Surveying the history and purpose of the ATS reveals that corpo-
rate liability is consistent with Congress’s goals in passing the statute,
as the court in Doe found.143 Both the Supreme Court in Sosa144 and the
D.C. Circuit in Doe145 identified the First Congress’s desire to avert for-
eign affairs crises by providing adequate judicial remedies for violations
of the law of nations and U.S. treaties as the primary impetus for passing
the ATS. To support this position, both cases also made reference to several
specific events that exemplified the purpose of the ATS in this context. For
instance, in 1787, a New York policeman entered the residence of the
Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his servants, a violation over which
142 See, e.g., Doe, 653 F.3d at 43 (noting the “brevity of the text of the ATS and the absence
of a formal legislative history” and the lack of distinction “among classes of defendants”).
143 See id.
144 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–19 (2004).
145 Doe, 654 F.3d at 46.
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the federal government did not have jurisdiction.146 As a result, the success
of the Ambassador’s claim depended on whether the common law recog-
nized the intrusion as a breach.147 The absence of a clear remedy for such
a sensitive incident caused both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
to express concern over the likelihood of negative foreign affairs repercus-
sions if the federal government did not offer appropriate redress for such
violations.148 Furthermore, in the “Sierra Leone Affair” of 1794, a U.S.
citizen was accused of helping a French privateer attack and plunder the
British colony of Sierra Leone during a war between Britain and France.149
Attorney General William Bradford issued an opinion on the matter a year
later, finding that the Sierra Leone Company could sue under the ATS.150
These examples illustrate that Congress’s main purpose in passing
the ATS was to avoid foreign affairs crises resulting from violations of the
law of nations.151 Corporate liability is consistent with this goal because
corporations would have been just as capable of damaging international
relations as an individual at the time of the ATS’s passage.152 As the court
in Doe put it:
The historical context, in clarifying the text and purpose
of the ATS, suggests no reason to conclude that the First
Congress was supremely concerned with the risk that nat-
ural persons would cause the United States to be drawn
into foreign entanglements, but was content to allow formal
legal associations of individuals, i.e., corporations, to do so.153
This quote succinctly and elegantly captures the crux of the corporate lia-
bility issue. Since the passage of the ATS, U.S. corporations have multi-
plied and expanded their presence to countries around the world.154 They
146 Id. at 45 (citing Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 587, 641 (2002)).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 23, 47.
150 Id. at 47 (citing 1 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795)).
151 See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., Doe, 654 F.3d at 43.
153 Id. at 47.
154 E.g., Global Presence, DUNKIN’ DONUTS, http://www.dunkindonuts.com/content/dunkin
donuts/en/company/global.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (operating in 30 countries
outside of the U.S.); Global Presence, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/ourcompany
/global/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (doing business with customers in eighty nations while
maintaining offices in nineteen); Our Locations, in Our Story, WALMART, http://corporate
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provide a variety of services and goods in foreign consumer markets and
employ thousands upon thousands of people abroad. While such corpora-
tions are in a position to help the United States achieve foreign policy goals
by establishing close ties with host nations, they are also in a position to
cause problems, not the least of which could be entangling the United
States in an international relations crisis. Thus, ensuring that foreign
nationals have sufficient redress in U.S. courts is just as important today
as it was in 1789.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS UNDER THE ATS
Even if the Supreme Court upholds corporate liability in Kiobel,
the question remains whether victims of environmental harm can rely on
the ATS to hold corporations liable for their actions. This section exam-
ines the current status of environmental ATS cases under both prongs
of the statute.
A. “Law of Nations”
The majority of environmental ATS cases fall under the “law of
nations” prong,155 yet none have been successful thus far.156 This has forced
commentators to conclude that, at least for the moment, international en-
vironmental law norms have not sufficiently crystallized to pass Sosa’s
test.157 As such, victims of environmental harm need to know when inter-
national environmental law norms will become sufficiently concrete. What
.walmart.com/our-story/locations (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (boasting operations in twenty-
seven nations worldwide).
155 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 521 (“The large majority of ATS cases, including
those concerned with environmental harm, were brought under the ‘law of nations’ prong
of the ATS.”).
156 See id. at 526, 535. While none has yet been successful, it should be noted that litiga-
tion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, a case involving allegations of environmental harm result-
ing from defendant’s mining operations in Papua New Guinea, is ongoing in the Ninth
Circuit where most recently the court referred the matter to mediation. See Sarah A.
Altschuller, Ten Years and Counting: Ninth Circuit Refers Sarei v. Rio Tinto to a Mediator,
CORPORATE SOC. RESPONSIBILITY & THE LAW (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.csrandthelaw
.com/2010/11/articles/litigation/alien-tort-statute/ten-years-and-counting-ninth-circuit
-refers-sarei-v-rio-tinto-to-a-mediator/.
157 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 534 (“Applying Sosa’s standard to international en-
vironmental law norms it seems clear that they do not yet pass the test of universal rec-
ognition comparable to 18th century norms; for now they cannot support an environmental
ATS claim under the ‘law of nations’ prong.”).
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follows is an assessment of several emerging environmental and human
rights norms that have featured prominently in ATS environmental liti-
gation involving corporations.158
1. Cross-Border Pollution
Cross-border pollution refers to the international environmental
law principle that states are responsible for ensuring that the effects of
natural resource exploitation within their borders do not cause environ-
mental damage in other states.159 Now considered part of customary in-
ternational law, this principle has appeared in the 1941 Trail Smelter
Arbitration between the U.S. and Canada, International Court of Justice
opinions, Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 2
of the 1992 Rio Declaration.160
In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., a case involving allegedly toxic
shipments of copper residue from the U.S. to the United Kingdom, the
district court for the Southern District of New York held that plaintiff
Amlon could not rely on Principle 21 to allege an ATS violation because it
lacked specificity by only referring “in a general sense to the responsibility
of nations.”161
Likewise, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., which involved al-
leged environmental abuses by defendant mining corporation in Indonesia,
the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that while
Principle 21 and Principle 2 were “sufficiently substantive” to establish
“the basis of an international cause of action,” they did “not constitute
international torts for which there is a universal consensus in the interna-
tional community as to their binding status and their content.”162 Further-
more, the court noted that these principles apply only to state action and
158 For some examples of ATS environmental litigation, see id. at 526–34 (discussing five
separate cases involving corporations where the plaintiff alleged either environmental or
human rights torts or both); Daniel Bodansky & Mary Manous, International Environmental
Law in U.S. Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, at 243–
45 (Michael Anderson & Paolo Galizzi eds., 2002).
159 See, e.g., SUMUDU A. ATAPATTU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW xxiv, 2 (Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2006) (citing Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and discussing the emergence of cross-border environmental issues).
160 See id. at xxiv, 2–5. The I.C.J. cases referred to above include the Corfu Channel Case
(U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, and the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226. Id. at 3–4.
161 775 F. Supp. 668, 669–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
162 969 F. Supp. 362, 365, 383–84 (E.D. La. 1997).
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thus, do not bind corporate entities.163 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court, finding that the plaintiff had failed “to show that [the
principles] enjoy universal acceptance in the international community” as
required by the ATS.164 The court also concluded that the principles lacked
specificity: “The sources of international law cited by Beanal and the amici
merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state
abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards
and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environ-
mental abuses or torts.”165
Though the Fifth Circuit did not expressly address the lower court’s
finding regarding state action, it appears from the opinion that the court
would not find a state action claim any more cognizable than the private
action disposed of in the proceedings. However, the lack of clarity on this
point and the fact that only one circuit has spoken on the subject perhaps
leaves the door open to an aiding-and-abetting166 or state action167 claim
under the right set of facts.
Such facts were at issue in Arias v. Dyncorp where Ecuadorian
villagers brought an ATS suit for harm resulting from herbicide sprayed
in Colombia by the defendant to eradicate cocaine and heroine farms.168
Dyncorp had contracted with the U.S. State Department to provide these
services as a part of Plan Colombia, a Congressionally approved counter-
narcotics campaign.169 Tragically, the spraying caused extensive damage
to both crops and farm animals, forcing many inhabitants to flee their
163 Id. at 384.
164 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
165 Id.
166 Aiding and abetting is a theory used by ATS plaintiffs to hold “non-state actors” liable
for tortious conduct committed primarily by state actors, especially when the latter will
likely be protected by the act of state doctrine or Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See
generally Ryan S. Lincoln, Note, To Proceed with Caution? Aiding and Abetting Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 604 (2010). Both the Second and
Ninth Circuits have recognized aiding and abetting as a means of holding corporations
liable under the ATS. E.g., id. at 605–10. See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2002), Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), and
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
167 The state action theory arises when courts must decide whether private actors can be
held liable under the ATS for violations of international law norms that traditionally ap-
plied only to state actors. See, e.g., Jessica Priselac, Note, The Requirement of State Action
in Alien Tort Statute Claims: Does Sosa Matter?, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 789, 792 (2007).
Specifically, the state action theory provides a mechanism for imputing the actions of
private parties to a state. Id.
168 517 F. Supp.2d 221, 223 (D.D.C. 2007).
169 Id.
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homes.170 In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dyncorp’s actions
violated “numerous treaties and international agreements.”171 Further-
more, the court found that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to
state a claim for state action based on the contract between the State
Department and Dyncorp.172
The question derived from this case is whether plaintiffs could
have sustained a cause of action under the ATS based on Principle 21 as
opposed to specific “treaties and agreements.” To the extent that a court
would be willing to find that Principle 21 passed the Sosa test for speci-
ficity and acceptance, it appears from the approach to state action in
Dyncorp that a corporation could be liable for cross-border pollution even
though Principle 21 traditionally applies to only state actors.
Thus, the cross-border pollution principle appears to provide a
possible avenue for plaintiffs but one limited to situations where the cor-
porate defendant has been working closely with the government.
2. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is an umbrella term covering certain
substantive and procedural elements aimed at ensuring the responsible
stewardship of natural resources and the environment.173 These include,
inter alia, the “rights of future generations; sustainable use of natural
resources; equitable use of natural resources; . . . the integration of envi-
ronment and development . . . [and] the right to participate in the decision-
making process.”174 Sustainable development appears in international
instruments ranging from the United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS”) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCC”).175
ATS plaintiffs have invoked the right to sustainable development
and its elements in several cases against corporations to date. For example,
in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, Corp., a case in which the defendant’s
mining operations allegedly caused environmental damage and lung dis-
ease, the district court for the Southern District of New York found that
170 Id. at 223–24.
171 Id. at 227.
172 Id. at 228.
173 See, e.g., ATAPATTU, supra note 159, at 93.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 140.
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plaintiffs failed to “demonstrat[e] that high levels of environmental pol-
lution within a nation’s borders, causing harm to . . . development, violate
well-established, universally recognized norms of international law.”176
Plaintiffs did not allege sustainable development violations on appeal.177
Commentators have responded to criticisms that sustainable devel-
opment lacks a concrete definition by pointing out that the concept is an
umbrella term and analyzing its legal status requires viewing each ele-
ment in isolation.178 Such an approach reveals that “some strands of sus-
tainable development do indeed have normative effect.”179 For instance,
Atapattu argues that the principle of integration, which includes environ-
mental impact assessments, “has received sufficient state practice to be
considered normative.”180 She also claims that the procedural elements
of sustainable development—access to information, participation in the
decision-making process, and the right to remedies—have attained the
status of customary international law.181 It is unclear whether an ATS
plaintiff could bring suit for a violation of such norms. However, in Sosa,
the Supreme Court “hinted that it might be amenable to recognizing an
exhaustion requirement as implicit in the [ATS].”182 The Ninth Circuit re-
fused to recognize such a requirement in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, noting
that the “Supreme Court has not addressed whether the methodology it
employed in Sosa to identify some substantive international norms as
falling within the [ATS’s] jurisdictional grant is applicable to procedural
and other nonsubstantive customary law norms.”183 Thus, it remains to
be seen whether ATS plaintiffs could rely on certain elements of the right
to sustainable development.
3. Rights to Life, Health, and the Environment
The rights to life, health, and the environment are first, second,
and third “generation” human rights respectively that frequently arise
in the context of environmental harm.184 ATS plaintiffs have not fared
176 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
177 Flores v. S. Peru Copper, Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 238 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003).
178 See, e.g., ATAPATTU, supra note 159, at 182.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 183.
181 Id. at 184.
182 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1213 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004)).
183 Id. at 1213, 1221.
184 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 524–25.
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well under these theories, but Jaeger argues that first generation human
rights “are most likely to pass the Sosa standard of universal recognition
among nations.”185
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit held
that plaintiff’s right to life and right to health claims were “insufficiently
definite to constitute rules of customary international law.”186 Specifically,
the court described these rights as “vague and amorphous” and “utterly
fail[ing] to specify what conduct would fall within or outside of the law.”187
Echoing these concerns, the district court for the Central District
of California in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC held that neither the right to life
nor health constituted a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm of in-
ternational law” and that plaintiffs’ expert failed to “detail what type of
conduct violates [them].”188 Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s
findings on these issues.189 Thus, to the extent that these rights do not
become more concrete, it is unlikely that they will provide feasible ave-
nues for recovery under the ATS.
Since Sosa, ATS plaintiffs alleging human rights violations have
enjoyed a reasonable degree of success.190 By contrast, “victims of envi-
ronmental harms have been among the least successful.”191 The primary
obstacle for environmental plaintiffs has been Sosa’s law of nations
“definiteness” test.192 This has prompted some commentators to dismiss
environmental tort claims in ATS cases in favor of alternative recovery
theories, such as “racial discrimination.”193
B. “Treaty of the United States”
Instances of environmental ATS claims based on treaties of the
United States are far fewer than those under the “law of nations.”194 As
185 Id. at 536.
186 414 F.3d 233, 254 (2d Cir. 2003).
187 Id. at 254, 55.
188 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1158, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
189 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2007).
190 See Sarah M. Morris, Note, The Intersection of Equal and Environmental Protection:
A New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims After Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 276 (2009).
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., id. (“Sosa’s strict standard means that such claims are unlikely to succeed
in the future.”).
193 See, e.g., id. (arguing that Sosa’s barriers to environmental tort are too high and that
plaintiffs should proceed under customary international law’s prohibition of racial dis-
crimination instead).
194 See Jaeger, supra note 39, at 522.
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described above, “[s]uch treaties need to create binding obligations, clearly
encompass conduct of private actors, and have been ratified by the United
States (or else be self-executing).”195 Despite the lack of case law, commen-
tators maintain that treaty claims are preferable to their law of nations
counterparts.196 The following is a brief survey of U.S. environmental
treaties that could serve as the basis for an ATS claim.
1. International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships
Commentators argue that the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”) could form the basis for an
ATS claim because it applies to private actors and is sufficiently specific.197
MARPOL is a “multilateral environmental instrument” that seeks to re-
duce various forms of pollution from ships.198 One-hundred sixty-one coun-
tries were parties as of December 2001.199 MARPOL is composed of twenty
Articles, of which the first (oil), second (noxious liquids carried in bulk),
third (harmful substances carried in packaged form), fourth (garbage from
ships), and sixth (air emissions) have entered into force in the United
States, and five Annexes.200 Congress implemented MARPOL via the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“APPS”).201
In general, MARPOL “permits each state to control discharges by
its own ships, wherever they may be, even on the high seas, and also al-
lows a state to enforce the MARPOL standards against all ships in its own
territorial waters.”202 Violating MARPOL or the APPS entails both civil
195 Id. at 535.
196 See James Boeving, Half Full . . . Or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort
Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 135–36 (2005)
(explaining that courts would look more favorably on the specificity provided by treaties
and opportunity to interpret their text).
197 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 535; Boeving, supra note 196, at 137.
198 Selected Multilateral Environmental Instruments in Force for the U.S., EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/history/topics/coop/#marpol (last updated Feb. 15, 2013).
199 International Treaties and Agreements, THE BORDER CTR., http://www.bordercenter
.org/chem/treaties.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
200 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
1340 U.N.T.S. 184; see also JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL34548, AIR
POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: MARPOL ANNEX VI AND OTHER CONTROL OPTIONS 3 (2008),
available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20051.pdf.
201 See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et. seq. (2006); see
also Marjorie A. Shields, Construction and Application of Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships (APPS), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901 et seq., 38 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 565 at § 2 (2009).
202 See Shields, supra note 201, § 2.
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and criminal penalties, and offending ships can be held liable in rem.203
Anyone who is or could be “adversely affected” by an APPS violation can
bring suit against the alleged transgressor.204 Such transgressors typically
include corporate vessel owners or ship management companies while the
United States plays the role of plaintiff enforcer.205
As noted by Jaeger and other commentators, MARPOL appears to
provide an avenue for recovery under the treaty prong of the ATS because
its provisions are specific and cover private actors; however, it is not clear
that many incidents would trigger its application.206 For instance, most
of the environmental ATS cases discussed above occurred outside of U.S.
territorial waters and did not involve discharges or emissions from U.S.
flag vessels. Thus, MARPOL represents a possibly effective but narrowly
defined tool for ATS plaintiffs.
2. Convention for the Protection and Development of the
Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region
The Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (“Cartagena Convention”)207
is “a comprehensive, umbrella agreement for the protection and develop-
ment of the marine environment” in the Caribbean region.208 The Con-
vention was adopted in 1983 and entered into force three years later.209
Under its umbrella are three protocols addressing “oil spills, specially
protected areas and wildlife and land-based sources and activities of
marine pollution.”210
The first, the Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Oil
Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region may be relevant to ATS plaintiffs.
This protocol has been ratified by the United States, Mexico, Belize,
203 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1908).
204 Id.
205 See, e.g., id. § 3 (citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.
Me. 2007); U.S. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D.P.R. 1997); U.S. v.
Ionia Management S.A., 498 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D. Conn. 2007)).
206 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
207 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157.
208 About the Cartagena Convention, under The Caribbean Environment Programme,
UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013).
209 About the Cartagena Convention, supra note 208.
210 About the CEP, under The Caribbean Environment Programme, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME, http://www.cep.unep.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
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Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic,
Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and French Guiana, among others.211 Like
MARPOL, the oil spill protocol refers directly to private parties and is
specific about what type of behavior constitutes a violation:
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish appropriate pro-
cedures to ensure that information regarding oil spill inci-
dents is reported as rapidly as possible, and shall, inter alia:
(a) require its appropriate officials, masters of ships
flying its flag and persons in charge of offshore facili-
ties operating under its jurisdiction to report to it any
oil spill incident involving their ships or facilities;
(b) request masters of all ships and pilots of all air-
craft operating in the vicinity of its coasts to report
to it any oil spill incident of which they are aware.212
However, a defendant in an ATS claim would inevitably point out that
this section of the protocol appears to bind Contracting Parties (states) as
opposed to private actors themselves. Furthermore, the limited geographic
area covered by the protocol and limited subject matter—oil pollution in-
cidents involving vessels—indicate that the treaty would cover a narrow
set of circumstances.213 Thus, the Cartagena Convention’s oil spill proto-
col may offer ATS plaintiffs some assistance but only under the right set
of facts.
The other two protocols suffer from the same restraints. For in-
stance, the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife
(“SPAW”), which the United States and at least ten other countries have
ratified,214 provides that each Party (state) shall take measures to protect
designated wildlife areas, including “the regulation or prohibition of indus-
trial activities and of other activities which are not compatible with the
uses that have been envisaged for the area by national measures and/or
211 See Ratification of the Cartagena Convention & Oil Spills Protocol, UNITED NATIONS
ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/convention-and-oil-spills
.png/view (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
212 Protocol Concerning Co-Operation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean
Region, Art. 5(1)(a)–(b), Mar. 24, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 240, 242 (1983) (emphasis added).
213 See id. at Arts. 2, 3.
214 Ratification of the SPAW Protocol, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.cep
.unep.org/cartagena-convention/ratification-spaw.png/view (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
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environmental impact assessments.”215 Likewise, the Protocol Concerning
Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities (“LBS Protocol”), which
has been ratified by the United States and at least four other countries,216
provides that Contracting Parties (states) must take extractive industries
and oil refineries, among other priority source activities, into account when
formulating pollution prevention measures.217 More specifically, it requires
states to conduct environmental impact assessments in conjunction with
“affected persons” when the state has “reasonable grounds to believe that
a planned land-based activity . . . is likely to cause substantial pollution.”218
Though perhaps less certain in terms of private party obligations than
the oil spill protocol, these two protocols arguably offer ATS plaintiffs some
protection from damage caused by mining and oil corporations. However,
like the oil spill protocol, any such protection would be limited to a narrow
set of facts and subject to certain defenses.
3. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal
Though it has yet to be ratified by the U.S., the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and
Their Disposal (“Basel Convention”)219 also shows promise for certain
ATS plaintiffs.220 Not only has the Obama Administration indicated a will-
ingness to support ratification,221 but it also appears that the convention
215 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
Art. 5(k) (1990), available at http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/spaw-protocol
/spaw-protocol-en.pdf (emphasis added).
216 Ratification of LBS Protocol, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.cep.unep
.org/cartagena-convention/ratification-lbs.png (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
217 Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities to the Convention
for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region, Annex I (1999), available at http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/lbs
-protocol/lbs-protocol-english.
218 Id. Art. VII.
219 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126.
220 Basel Convention Ratifications, BASEL CONVENTION, http://archive.basel.int/ratif
/convention.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
221 See, e.g., David E. Markert & David B. Weinberg, Implications of the Obama Adminis-
tration’s National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, THE METRO. CORPORATE COUNSEL,
Nov. 2011, at 18A, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/November/18A
.pdf (noting that the national strategy supports ratification of the Basel Convention).
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constitutes “customary international law” sufficient for an ATS “law of
nations” claim.222
The Basel Convention’s goal is to protect people and the environ-
ment from the health hazards associated with the “generation, manage-
ment, transboundary movements and disposal of hazardous and other
wastes.”223 Specifically, the Convention provides for the behavior of pri-
vate actors: “[f]or the purposes of this Convention . . . ‘Person’ means any
natural or legal person . . . ‘Exporter’ means any person under the juris-
diction of the State of export who arranges for hazardous wastes or other
wastes to be exported.”224 Furthermore, the convention is clear about what
type of behavior constitutes a violation: “[e]ach Party shall take the appro-
priate measures to . . . ensure that persons involved in the management
of hazardous wastes . . . take such steps as are necessary to prevent pol-
lution due to hazardous wastes . . . and, if such pollution occurs, to mini-
mize the consequences thereof for human health and the environment.”225
Thus, to the extent the U.S. decides to ratify the convention or the fed-
eral courts determine its provisions constitute customary international
law, the Basel Convention could function as an extremely useful tool for
ATS plaintiffs under the right set of facts.
IV. MEASURES THE U.S. CAN TAKE TO MAKE THE ATS
MORE POWERFUL
As demand for natural resources grows, corporations will continue
to expand their mining, oil, gas, and other extraction operations around
the world. As discussed above, environmental damage is an unfortunate
consequence of these activities. In some cases, victims will be able to seek
remedies at home, but in others adequate relief will not be available due
to rule-of-law shortcomings.
222 See, e.g., Raechel Anglin, Note, International Environmental Law Gets Its Sea Legs:
Hazardous Waste Dumping Claims Under the ATCA, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 248,
255 (2007) (arguing that the Basel Convention’s “broad acceptance by the international
community” demonstrates an “international consensus” that exporting hazardous waste to
developing countries is a violation of customary international law cognizable under the ATS).
223 Welcome to the Website of the Basel Convention!, BASEL CONVENTION, http://archive
.basel.int/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
224 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Art. 2 (2010), available at http://archive.basel.int/text/17Jun2010-conv
-e.pdf (emphasis added).
225 Id. Art. 4(2)(c).
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The ATS provides a mechanism, albeit an imperfect one, to assist
in addressing this problem. If maintained in its current form, the statute
may eventually be capable of addressing environmental claims as emerg-
ing international law norms continue to crystallize. However, it is unclear
when this will happen and what the scope of available environmental
claims ultimately will be. Moreover, the Supreme Court may uphold cor-
porate immunity under the ATS in its forthcoming Kiobel opinion. Given
the severity of the problem and the likelihood of continued uncertainty,
the U.S. should take steps to strengthen the ATS by amending the statute
to include environmental torts.
Amending the ATS to include environmental torts would be the
most effective way to encourage corporate responsibility and provide vic-
tims a fair opportunity to seek redress in U.S. courts. Taking such action
would be consistent with Congress’s 1992 torture amendment to the ATS
and its efforts to curb bribery abroad through the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.226 Finally, a recent bill in the Canadian Parliament, C-323,227 provid-
ing for environmental torts offers a possible model for an ATS amendment
and underscores how seriously countries in which multinational extraction
companies are based are taking this issue.
A. The TVPA as a Model for an Environmental Torts
Amendment to the ATS
Codifying an environmental tort cause of action under the ATS
would not be the first time Congress has amended the statute to address
a specific concern. In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection
Act (“TVPA”), a note amendment to the ATS providing a civil cause of ac-
tion in American courts for torture committed abroad.228 The TVPA pro-
vides in relevant part:
[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation—
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
226 Tort Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. (2006).
227 An Act to Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights), R.S.Q. c. C-323 (Can.) (proposed legislation), available at http://www.parl
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5160018&file=4.
228 Emily M. Martin, Note, Torture, Inc.: Corporate Liability Under the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 175, 177 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
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(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the indi-
vidual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be
a claimant in an action for wrongful death.229
The TVPA also explicitly requires the exhaustion of remedies to ensure
that plaintiffs pursue recourse locally before bringing suit in an American
court.230 Finally, the TVPA contains a ten-year statute of limitations,231
specific definitions for “torture” and other key terms and phrases,232 and
a provision for standing to sue for legal representatives of the victim under
certain circumstances.233
According to TVPA’s legislative history, the amendment serves
three primary purposes: (1) to provide a clear grant by Congress for a pri-
vate right of action for torture to avoid foreign policy separation of powers
issues; (2) to offer remedies to both foreign aliens and U.S. citizens tortured
abroad; and (3) to “carry out the intent of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” which
the U.S. ratified in 1990.234 By contrast, the ATS’s legislative history is
largely unknown.235 As a result, courts have reached differing interpreta-
tions on how the two statutes interact.236 “The majority view is that the
TVPA and the ATS provide two distinct causes of action,” allowing plain-
tiffs to bring claims under both the ATS and the TVPA simultaneously.237
The minority view is that “claims for torture and extrajudicial killing must
be brought exclusively under the TVPA.”238
The TVPA provides both the rationale and roadmap for an environ-
mental torts amendment to the ATS. For instance, the first purpose of the
TVPA is directly applicable to environmental torts. Like concerns about
meddling with foreign policy in the torture context, courts have declined to
adjudicate environmental torts cases due to their belief that the executive
229 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a)(1)–(2).
230 Ekaterina Apostolova, Note, The Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Prevention Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 640, 648 (2010).
231 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(c).
232 § 3(a).
233 Apostolova, supra note 230, at 651.
234 Id. at 642.
235 Id. “The Supreme Court stated that there is a poverty of drafting history of the ATS
which makes it fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has
proved elusive.” Id. n.8 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004)).
236 Id. at 643.
237 Id. at 645.
238 Id. at 643.
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branch would be better suited to handle the issue.239 To address these
concerns, Congress should provide an express grant of jurisdiction to the
courts via an environmental tort amendment to the ATS.
The TVPA’s second purpose, which focuses on extending benefits
to U.S. citizens, also resonates in the ATS context. While it does not appear
that many U.S. citizens are in danger of becoming victims of environmental
harm abroad, an environmental ATS amendment could extend benefits
to U.S. corporate defendants. For instance, under the current ATS scheme,
corporate defendants are subject to a great deal of uncertainty in terms
of facing liability due to competing views on which body of law—federal
common law or international law—controls in a given situation.240 Amend-
ing the ATS, by contrast, would clarify such issues and offer a degree of
consistency, thereby helping corporations structure their behavior to
avoid violations.
The third purpose behind the TVPA is carrying out the intent of
a specific multilateral torture prevention treaty and is also applicable in
the environmental tort context. Over the past several decades, the United
States has engaged with the international community to promote anti-
pollution goals.241 Amending the ATS to provide additional protections
against a variety of environmental harms would help ensure compliance
with these and other treaties.
The TVPA also provides the roadmap for an environmental ATS
amendment. Like the TVPA, an environmental amendment would benefit
from specific provisions addressing who can be sued, who has standing
to sue, distinct types of violations with definitions, and a statute of limi-
tations. The corporate liability debate discussed above is just one example
of the confusion surrounding the application of the ATS in its current form.
Amending the statute along the same lines as the TVPA would enhance
fairness and efficiency by providing clear rules to address the complexities
surrounding environmental claims.
B. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The idea of amending the ATS also finds support in prior congres-
sional efforts to regulate U.S. corporate behavior abroad. For instance,
239 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 532–33 (explaining that the trial court in Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC dismissed the plaintiffs ATS claims, including allegations of environmental
harm, based on the act of state doctrine).
240 Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2010) with Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); see supra Parts II.B–C.
241 See, e.g., Selected Multilateral Environmental Instruments in Force for the U.S., EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/coop/ (last updated Feb. 15, 2013).
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in 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)242
“making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make
payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retain-
ing business.”243 According to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the FCPA
resulted from United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
findings in the mid-1970s that “more than 400 U.S. companies had paid
hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to foreign government officials
to secure business overseas.”244 Since then, the statute has resulted in
numerous criminal and civil enforcement actions, as well as spurring self-
imposed compliance programs to avoid such problems.245
There are five elements that must be met to constitute a violation
of the FCPA: (1) an appropriate actor—e.g., any individual, firm, officer,
director, employee, or agent acting on behalf of the firm; (2) corrupt intent;
(3) payment or offer to pay money; (4) an appropriate recipient—e.g., a
foreign official, political party, or party official; and (5) a business purpose
in paying the bribe.246
The FCPA and an environmental torts amendment to the ATS
share much in common. In both cases, corporations seeking greater profits
cause harm to the populations of foreign countries by engaging in behavior
that is prohibited in the United States. While graft likely occurs more fre-
quently than corporate-induced environmental disasters, the latter argu-
ably produce greater harm. At worst, systematic bribery reinforces social
inequalities by ensuring that those in power stay there and diminishes
competition, the cost of which is passed on to consumers in the form of less
efficient solutions and more expensive goods.247 By contrast, environmental
disasters not only demolish irreplaceable natural resources but also act
as the catalyst for violence and bloodshed.248
242 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, et seq. (2006).
243 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
244 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
245 Id. at 4–7.
246 See id. at 10–21.
247 See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 781, 800–01 (2011) (explaining that bribery raises transaction costs, reduces par-
ticipation in markets where bribery is prevalent, and increases the cost of goods of end-
user consumers).
248 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 39, at 527–28 (noting plaintiff Indonesian villagers claims
in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran included both cultural genocide and human rights abuses,
along with environmental torts).
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If Congress believed that the problems presented by bribery de-
served codification on the basis of the resulting harm, then environmental
torts should receive the same treatment. The FCPA demonstrates that
Congress is capable of identifying unacceptable corporate behavior abroad
and remedying it with legislative action.
C. Canadian Legislation as a Model for an Environmental
ATS Amendment
Canada, which is home to a number of multinational mining cor-
porations, has recently witnessed vigorous debate on several pieces of leg-
islation aimed at holding corporations liable for environmental damage
resulting from their activities abroad.249 One of these bills, C-323 (formerly
C-354), is modeled on the ATS250 and codifies specific environmental and
human rights torts.251 Specifically, C-323 provides that the Federal Court’s
jurisdiction shall include all civil cases for violations of international law
or a treaty of Canada commenced by non-citizens and committed abroad,
including, inter alia:
(m) wanton destruction of the environment that directly or
indirectly initiates widespread, long-term or severe damage
to an ecosystem, a natural habitat or a population of species
in its natural surroundings;
(n) transboundary pollution that directly or indirectly brings
about significant harm to persons living in an adjacent state
or territory;
(o) the failure of a person or government agency with di-
rect knowledge of an impending environmental emergency
to immediately and adequately alert persons whose life,
249 See, e.g., Catherine Wilmarth, Mining Megaliths in the Argentine Andes: Where Will
Victims of Environmental Degradation Find Justice?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 959, 961 (2012).
250 See, e.g., Mary Dirmeitis, Bill C-323: A Tough on Crime Idea We Actually Like, THIS
MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2011) http://this.org/blog/2011/11/01/corporate-accountability-bill-c-323/.
251 An Act to Amend the Federal Courts Act (International Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights), R.S.Q. c. C-323 (Can.) (proposed legislation), available at http://www.parl
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5160018&file=4.
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health or property is seriously threatened by the environ-
mental emergency.252
These provisions provide a model for Congress to consider should it decide
to amend the ATS. However, C-323 is far from perfect. For example, the bill
fails to define “wanton destruction” or “significant harm,” among other key
terms. While measuring environmental harm is a difficult task, Congress
would be wise to provide specific definitions, as it did in the TVPA, to
avoid excessive litigation over the meaning of such terms.
None of the Canadian bills addressing environmental torts have
thus far become law,253 though C-323 is currently under consideration by
Parliament.254 Despite support from various environmental groups, such
legislation has met with strong resistance from the ruling conservative
party and mining industry factions.255 They argued that the legislation
would hurt Canadian companies by making them less competitive.256 It
is likely that an environmental ATS amendment would face similar oppo-
sition in the U.S., but the political ramifications of such an effort are out-
side the scope of this paper. Thus, C-323 provides a model for Congress in
considering an environmental amendment to the ATS and demonstrates
the seriousness with which similarly situated countries are approaching
the issue of corporate responsibility in developing countries.
CONCLUSION
The ATS has the potential to ensure greater corporate social
responsibility in the environmental context abroad. However, it is a flawed
mechanism in its current state. Even if the Supreme Court finds that corpo-
rations can be held liable under the ATS, it is unclear when environmental
tort claims will be recognized as violations of the “law of nations” or when
the United States will ratify more stringent environmental treaties. On
the other hand, if the Court upholds corporate immunity or determines
252 Id. § 1(2)(m)–(o).
253 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 249, at 965 n.43 (noting that Bill C-300 was defeated
in October 2010); Dirmeitis, supra note 250 (describing how Member of Parliament Peter
Julian has “resurrected” his previous Bill C-354 as Bill C-323).
254 E.g., 41st Parliament, 1st Session (June 2, 2011–Present), LEGISinfo, PARLIAMENT OF
CANADA, http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&billId=
5138027&View=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that Bill C-323 was introduced and
had its first reading in the House of Commons on October 5, 2011).
255 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 249, at 985.
256 Id.
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that the ATS does not apply to events occurring in other countries, the
statute will essentially be rendered ineffective as a tool for international
environmental enforcement. Thus, under either scenario, Congress should
take direct action by amending the ATS to provide a remedy for corporate-
induced environmental harm in U.S. courts. This approach is not only
consistent with the history and purpose of the ATS, but it is also in line
with previous efforts by Congress to discourage torture through the TVPA
and bribery through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
